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Many market participants now employ algorithmic trading, commonly defined as the use of computer
algorithms, to automatically make certain trading decisions, submit orders and manage those orders
after submission. Identifying and understanding the impact of algorithmic trading on financial markets
has become a critical issue for market operators and regulators. Advanced data feeds and audit trail
information from market operators now allow for the full observation of market participants’ actions.
A key question is the extent to which it is possible to understand and characterize the behaviour
of individual participants from observations of trading actions. In this paper, we consider the basic
problems of categorizing and recognizing traders (or, equivalently, trading algorithms) on the basis of
observed limit orders. These problems are of interest to regulators engaged in strategy identification for
the purposes of fraud detection and policy development. Methods have been suggested in the literature
for describing trader behaviour using classification rules defined over a feature space consisting of
summary trading statistics of volume and inventory, along with derived variables that reflect the
consistency of buying or selling behaviour. Our principal contribution is to suggest an entirely different
feature space that is constructed by inferring key parameters of a sequential optimization model that
we take as a surrogate for the decision-making process of the traders. In particular, we model trader
behaviour in terms of a Markov decision process. We infer the reward (or objective) function for
this process from observations of trading actions using a process from machine learning known as
inverse reinforcement learning (IRL). The reward functions learned through IRL then constitute a
feature space that can be the basis for supervised learning (for classification or recognition of traders)
or unsupervised learning (for categorization of traders). Making use of a real-world data-set from the
E-Mini futures contract, we compare two principal IRL variants, linear IRL and Gaussian Process
IRL, against a method based on summary trading statistics. Results suggest that IRL-based feature
spaces support accurate classification and meaningful clustering. Further, we argue that, because they
attempt to learn traders’ underlying value propositions under different market conditions, the IRL
methods are more informative and robust than the summary statistic-based approach and are well
suited for discovering new behaviour patterns of market participants.
Keywords: Inverse reinforcement learning; Gaussian process; High-frequency trading; Algorithmic
trading; Behavioural finance; Markov decision process; Support vector machine
1. Introduction
Financial markets have changed dramatically over the past 10
years or so. These changes reflect the culmination of a decade-
long trend from a market structure with primarily manual floor
trading to a market structure dominated by automated com-
puter trading. This rapid transformation has been driven by the
evolution of technologies for generating, routing and executing
∗Corresponding authors. Emails: syang14@stevens.edu, ak67@mit.edu
orders, which have dramatically improved the speed, capacity
and sophistication of the trading functions that are available to
market participants.
High-quality trading markets promote capital formation and
allocation by establishing prices for securities and by enabling
investors to enter and exit their positions in securities wher-
ever and whenever they wish to do so. The one important
feature of all types of algorithmic trading strategy is to discover
the underlying persistent tradable phenomena and generate
© 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
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appropriate trading opportunities. These trading opportunities
include microsecond price movements that allow a trader to
benefit from market-making trades, several minute-long strate-
gies that trade on momentum forecast by market microstruc-
ture theories, and several hour-long market movements that
surround recurring events and deviations from statistical re-
lationship (Aldridge 2010). Algorithmic traders then design
their trading algorithms and systems with the aim of generating
signals that result in consistent positive outcomes under differ-
ent market conditions. Different strategies may target different
frequencies, and the profitability of a trading strategy is often
measured by a certain return metric. The most commonly used
measure is the Sharpe ratio, a risk-adjusted return metric first
proposed by Sharpe (1966).
In particular, there is a subgroup within the algorithmic
trading strategies called high-frequency trading (HFT) strate-
gies that have attracted significant attention from investors,
regulators, policy-makers and academics. According to the US
Securities and Exchange Commission, high-frequency traders
are “professional traders acting in a proprietary capacity that
engage in strategies that generate a large number trades on
daily basis.” (The SEC Concept Release on Equity Market
Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3603, 21 January 2010). The SEC
characterized HFT as (1) the use of extraordinary high-speed
and sophisticated computer programs for generating, routing
and executing orders; (2) use of co-location services and indi-
vidual data feeds offered by exchanges and others to minimize
network and other types of latencies; (3) very short time-frames
for establishing and liquidating positions; (4) the submission
of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission;
and (5) ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as
possible (that is, not carrying significant, unhedged positions
over night). Although many HFT strategies exist today and
they are largely unknown to public, researchers have recently
shed light on their general characteristics. Several illustrative
HFT strategies include: (1) acting as an informal or formal
market-maker, (2) high-frequency relative-value trading and
(3) directional trading on news releases, order flow or other
high-frequency signals (Jones 2012).
In the past few years there have been a number of studies of
HFT and algorithmic trading in general. Their primary objec-
tive is to understand the economic impact of these algorithmic
trading practices on market quality, including aspects such as
liquidity, price discovery process, trading costs, etc. On the
empirical side, some researchers have been able to identify
a specific HFT from the data, and others are able to identify
whether a trade is from algorithmic traders. Given the amount
of information provided by exchanges and data vendors, it is
possible to describe patterns in algorithmic order submission,
order cancellation and trading behaviour. It is also possible
to see whether algorithmic or HFT activities are correlated
with bid–ask spreads, temporary and/or permanent volatility,
trading volume, and other market activity and quality mea-
sures. Hendershott et al. (2004) study the implementation of an
automated quote at the New York Exchange. They find that the
implementation of auto-quote is associated with an increase
in electronic message traffic and an improvement in market
quality, including narrowed effective spreads, reduced adverse
selection and increased price discovery. These effects are con-
centrated in large-cap firms, and there is little effect in the
small-cap stocks. Menkveld (2012) studies the July 2007 entry
of a high-frequency market-maker into the trading of Dutch
stocks. He argues that the competition between trading venues
facilitated the arrival of high-frequency market-makers and,
in general, HFTs, and he shows that high-frequency market-
maker entry is associated with 23% less adverse selection.
Also the volatility measured using 20 minutes realized volatil-
ity is unaffected by the entry of the high-frequency market-
maker. Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012) examine the effect
of a technological upgrade on the market quality of 98 ac-
tively traded German stocks. They conclude that the ability to
update quotes faster helps liquidity providers minimize their
losses to liquidity demanders, and more price discovery takes
place. Boehmer et al. (2012) examine international evidence
on electronic message traffic and the market quality across
39 stock exchanges over the 2001–2009 period. They find
that co-location increases algorithmic trading and HFT, and
that the introduction of co-location improves liquidity and
the information efficiency of prices. They claim, however,
that volatility does not decline as much as it would based
on the observed narrower bid–ask spreads. Gai et al. (2012)
study the effect of two recent 2010 Nasdaq technology up-
grades that reduce the minimum time between messages from
950 nanoseconds to 200 nanoseconds. These technological
changes lead to a substantial increase in the number of can-
celled orders, without significant change in overall trading
volume or in bid–ask spreads and depths. Overall, these stud-
ies have focused on empirical evidence that an increase in
algorithmic trading has positive influence on market quality in
general.
On the theoretical side, there are a number of models de-
veloped to understand the economic impact of these algo-
rithmic trading practices. Biais et al. (2012) conclude that
HFT can trade on new information more quickly than non-
HFT, generating adverse selection costs, and they also find
multiple equilibrium points in their model, and some exhibit
social inefficiency over investment in HFT. The model from
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010) shows that HFT can avoid
some adverse selection, and can provide some that benefit to
uninformed investors who need to trade. Martinez and Rosu
(2012) conclude from their model that HFT obtains and trades
on information an instant before it is available to others, and it
imposes adverse selection on market-makers. Therefore, liq-
uidity is worse and prices are no longer efficient. Martinez
and Rosu (2012) focus on HFTs that demand liquidity, and
suggest that HFT makes market prices extremely efficient by
incorporating information as soon as it becomes available.
Markets are not destabilized, as long as there is a popula-
tion of market-makers standing ready to provide liquidity at
competitive prices. Other related theoretical models include
Pagnotta and Philippon (2012), who focus on the investment
in speed made by exchanges in order to attract trading volume
from speed sensitive investors. Moallemi and Saglam (2012)
argue that a reduction in latency allows limit-order submitters
to update their orders more quickly, thereby reducing the value
of the trading option that a limit order grants to a liquidity
demander. The common theme in these models is that HFT
may increase adverse selection, and it is harmful for liquidity.
However, the ability to intermediate for traders who arrive at
different times is generally good for liquidity.
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Moreover, there have been a number of studies focused on al-
gorithmic traders’ behaviours. These studies examine the trad-
ing activities of different types of traders and try to distinguish
their behavioural differences. Hendershott and Riordan (2013)
use exchange classifications to distinguish algorithmic traders
from orders managed by humans. They find that algorithmic
traders concentrates on smaller trade sizes, while large block
trades of 5,000 shares or more are predominantly originated
by human traders. Algorithmic traders consume liquidity when
bid–ask spreads are relatively narrow, and they supply liquid-
ity when bid–ask spreads are relatively wide. This suggests
that algorithmic traders provide a more consistent level of
liquidity through time. Brogaard (2012) and Hendershott et al.
(2004) work with Nasdaq data that flag whether trades involve
HFT. Hendershott et al. (2004) find that HFT accounts for
about 42% of (double-counted) Nasdaq volume in large-cap
stocks but only about 17% of volume in small-cap stocks. They
estimate a state-space model that decomposes price changes
into permanent and temporary components, and measures the
contribution of HFT and non-HFT liquidity supply and liquid-
ity demand to each of these price change components. They
find that when HFTs initiate trades, they trade in the opposite
direction to the transitory component of prices. Thus, HFTs
contribute to price discovery and contribute to efficient stock
prices. Brogaard (2012) similarly finds that 68% of trades have
an HFT on at least one side of the transaction, and he also finds
that HFT participation rates are higher for stocks with high
share prices, large market caps, narrow bid–ask spreads, or low
stock-specific volatility. He estimates a vector autoregressive
permanent price impact model and finds that HFT liquidity
suppliers face less adverse selection than non-HFT liquid-
ity suppliers, suggesting that they are somewhat judicious in
supplying liquidity. Kirilenko et al. (2011) use account-level
tick-by-tick data on the E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract, and
they classify traders into various categories, including HFTs,
opportunistic traders, fundamental traders and noise traders.
Benos and Sagade (2012) conduct a similar analysis using
UK equity data. These different data-sets provide considerable
insight into overall HFT trading behaviour.
One of the important goals of learning traders trading strate-
gies is to be able to categorize and identify the market partici-
pants, and be able to further understand their influences related
to such important economic issues as multiple characteriza-
tions of price formation processes, market liquidity, and order
flow, etc. (Hasbrouck 1991, Jones et al. 1994, Hasbrouchk and
Seppi 2001, Gabaix et al. 2003, Gatheral 2010). We assert that
enhanced understanding of the economic implication of these
different algorithmic trading strategies will yield quantitative
evidence of value to market policy-makers and regulators seek-
ing to maintain transparency, fairness and overall health in the
financial markets.
In particular, traders deploy different trading strategies
where each strategy has a unique value proposition under a
particular market condition. In other words, we can cast this
problem as a sequential decision problem under different con-
ditions. Traders aim to optimize their decisions overtime and
consequently maximize their reward under different market
conditions. We can theoretically use reward functions to rep-
resent the value system that are encapsulated in the various
different trading strategies. It is possible to derive new policies
based on the reward functions learned and apply them in a
new environment to govern a new autonomous process. This
process is defined as reward learning under the framework of
inverse reinforcement learning (Ng and Russel 2000, Abbeel
and Ng 2004, Ramachandran and Amir 2007). For example, a
simple keep-or-cancel strategy for buying one unit, the trader
has to decide when to place the order and when to cancel the or-
der based on the market condition, which may likely be charac-
terized as a stochastic process. However, the value proposition
for the trader is to buy one unit of the security at the lowest price
possible. This could be realized in a number of ways. It could
be described as a reward function meaning when the system is
in a particular state, the trader is always looking for a fixed re-
ward. This notion of value proposition drives the trader to take
corresponding actions according to the market conditions. This
ultimately constitutes trader’s policies or strategies. Therefore,
a strategy under a certain value proposition can be consistently
programmed in algorithms to achieve its goal of buy-one-unit
in an optimal way. Consequently, strategies developed under
certain value frameworks can be observed, learned and even
reproduced in a different environment (such as a simulated
financial market where impact of these strategies can be readily
assessed). As documented by Yang et al. (2012), Hayes et al.
(2012) and Paddrik et al. (2012), the manipulative or disruptive
algorithmic strategies can be studied and monitored by market
operators and regulators to prevent unfair trading practices.
Furthermore, new emerging algorithmic trading practices can
be assessed and new regulations and policies can be evaluated
to maintain the overall health of the financial markets.
In this study, we model the trading behaviour of different
market participants by the solution to an inverse Markov deci-
sion process (MDP). We try to describe how traders are able to
take actions in a highly uncertain environment to reach return
goals on different horizons. This task can be solved using
dynamic programming (DP) and reinforcement learning (RL)
based on MDP. The model accounts for traders’ preferences
and expectations of uncertain state variables. In a general MDP
modelling setting, we describe these variables in two spaces:
the state space and the action space. From the trading decision
perspective, we can parameterize learning agents using reward
functions that depend on state and action. We consider the mar-
ket dynamics in view of the learning agents’ subjective beliefs.
The agents perform DP/RL through a sense, trial and learn
cycle. First, the agents gain state information from sensory
input. Based on the current state, knowledge and goals, the
agents find and choose the best action. Upon receiving new
feedback, the agents learn to update their knowledge with a
goal of maximizing their cumulative expected reward. In the
discrete-valued state and action problem space, DP and RL
methods use similar techniques involving policy iteration and
value iteration algorithms (Sutton and Barto 1998, Bertsekas
2007) to solve MDP problems. Formalisms for solving forward
problems of RL are often divided into model-based and model-
free approaches (Sutton and Barto 1998, Daw et al. 2005).
As framed by Abbeel and Ng (2004) under the inverse rein-
forcement learning (IRL) framework, the entire field of re-
inforcement learning is founded on the presupposition that
the reward function, rather than policy, is the most succinct,
robust and transferable definition of the task. However, the
reward function is often difficult to know in advance for some
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real-world tasks, so the following difficulties may arise: (1)
We have no experience to tackle the problem; (2) We have
experience but cannot interpret the reward function explicitly;
(3) The problem we solve may be interacting with the adver-
sarial decision-makers who make all their effort to keep the
reward function secret. Rather than accessing the true reward
function, it is easier to observe the behaviour of some other
agents (teacher/expert) to determine how to solve the problem.
Hence, we have motivation to learn from observations. Techni-
cal approaches to learning from observations generally fall into
two broad categories Ratliff et al. (2009). The first category,
called imitation learning, attempts to use supervised learning
to predict actions directly from observations of features of
the environments, which is unstable and vulnerable to highly
uncertain environment. The second category is concerned with
how to learn the reward function that characterizes the agent’s
objectives and preferences in MDP (Ng and Russel 2000).
IRLwas first introduced in machine learning literature by Ng
and Russel (2000) in formulating it as an optimization problem
to maximize the sum of differences between the quality of the
optimal action and the quality of the next-best action. Other
algorithms have been developed or integrated into apprentice-
ship learning based on this linear approximation of the reward
function. The principal idea of apprenticeship learning using
IRL is to search mixed solutions in a space of learned policies
with the goal that the cumulative feature expectation is near
that of the expert (Abbeel and Ng 2004, Syed et al. 2008).
Other algorithms have also been developed under the IRL
framework. A game-theoretic approach to apprenticeship
learning using IRLwas developed in the context of a two-player
zero-sum game in which the apprentice chooses a policy and
the environment chooses a reward function (Syed and Schapire
2008). Another algorithm for IRL is policy matching, in which
the loss function penalizing deviations from the expert’s policy
that is minimized by tuning the parameters of the reward func-
tions (Neu and Szepesvari 2007). The maximum entropy IRL
is proposed in the context of modelling real-world navigation
and driving behaviours (Ziebart et al. 2008). The algorithms
for apprenticeship learning using IRL do not actually aim to
recover the reward function but instead are only concerned
with the optimal policy. Ramachandran andAmir consider IRL
from a Bayesian perspective without assuming the linear ap-
proximation of the reward function (Ramachandran and Amir
2007). Their model interprets the observations from the expert
as the evidence that is used to obtain a posterior distribution
over reward using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation.
Recent theoretical works on IRL such as the framework of the
linear-solvable MDP(Dvijotham and Todorov 2004), bootstrap
learning (Boularias and Chaib 2010) and feature construction
(Levine et al. 2010), have also improved the learning perfor-
mance. IRL has also been successfully applied to many real-
world problems, such as the automatic control of helicopter
flight (Abbeel et al. 2010) and the motion control of an anima-
tion system in computer graphics (Lee and Zoran 2010).
We apply a Gaussian process-based IRL (GPIRL) model
proposed by Qiao and Beling (2011) to learn the trading be-
haviours under different market conditions. In this GPIRL,
a Gaussian prior is assigned on the reward function and the
reward function is treated as a Gaussian process. This approach
is similar to that of Ramachandran and Amir (2007), who
view the state-action samples from agents as the evidence
that will be used to update a prior value in the reward func-
tion, under a Bayesian framework. The solution (Ramachan-
dran and Amir 2007) depends on non-convex optimization
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation. Moreover, the
ill-posed nature of the inverse learning problem also presents
difficulties. Multiple reward functions may yield the same opt-
imal policy, and there may be multiple observations at a sin-
gle state given the true reward function. The GPIRL model
aims to address the ill-posed nature of this problem by apply-
ing Bayesian inference and preference graphs. Here, we are
faced with the challenge of modelling traders’ action as non-
deterministic policies. In general, agent’s policies range from
deterministic Markovian to randomized history dependent, de-
pending on how traders incorporate past information and how
traders select actions. Due to the uncertainty of the environment
and the random error of the measurement in the observations,
a deterministic policy could very likely be perceived as a non-
deterministic one. Modelling traders’ reward function using a
Gaussian process is well suited to address these issues. One of
the main novel features of this approach is that it not only
represents a probabilistic view but is also computationally
tractable.
The dynamic nature of financial markets makes it possible to
postulate a priori a relationship between the market variables
we observe and those we wish to predict. The main contribu-
tions of this study can be summarized as follows:
(i) We propose an entirely different feature space that is
constructed by inferring key parameters of a sequential
optimization model that we take as a surrogate for the
decision-making process of the traders. We infer the re-
ward (or objective) function for this process from obser-
vation of trading actions using a process from machine
learning known as inverse reinforcement learning (IRL).
(ii) We model traders’ reward functions using a Gaussian
process. We also apply preference graphs to address
the non-deterministic nature of the observed trading be-
haviours, reducing the uncertainty and computational
burden caused by the ill-posed nature of the inverse
learning problem.
(iii) We suggest a quantitative behavioural approach in cat-
egorizing algorithmic trading strategies using weighted
scores over time in the reward space, and we conclude
that it performs consistently better than the existing sum-
mary statistic-based trader classification approach
(Kirilenko et al. 2011).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First, we
discuss the summary statistics approach to trader classification
in section 2. We then discuss the framework of which we use to
model market dynamics and the traders’ decisions in section 3.
We extend the MDP and introduce IRL formulation in section
4. We review the original linear IRL formulation and provide a
Bayesian probabilistic model to infer the reward function using
Gaussian processes. We apply the GPIRL algorithm to the
E-Mini S&P 500 Futures market as an experiment in section
5. We show that the GPIRL algorithm can accurately capture
algorithmic trading behaviour based on observations of the
high-frequency data. We also compare our behaviour-based
classification results with the results from Kirilenko et al. (2011),
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and show that our behavioural approach represents a consistent
improvement. Finally, we provide concluding remarks about
the GPIRL and its applications in section 6.
2. Summary statistics approach to trader classification
Kirilenko et al. (2011) suggest an approach to classify indi-
vidual trading accounts based on the summary statistics of
trading volume and inventory and consistency of buying or
selling behaviour. Six categories are used to describe individual
trading accounts:
(i) High-frequency traders—high volume and low inven-
tory;
(ii) Intermediaries—low inventory;
(iii) Fundamental buyers—consistent intraday net buyers;
(iv) Fundamental sellers—consistent intraday net sellers;
(v) Opportunistic traders—all other traders not classified;
(vi) Small traders—low volume.
In this section, we develop the details for classification rules
corresponding to the six categories from Kirilenko et al. (2011),
and then apply these rules to a real-world futures contract
data-set.
2.1. E-Mini market data description
The E-Mini S&P 500 is a stock market index of futures con-
tracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s (CME)
Globex electronic trading platform. The notional value of one
contract is $50 times the value of the S&P 500 stock index. The
tick size for the E-Mini S&P 500 is 0.25 index points or $12.50.
For example, the S&P 500 Index futures contract is trading at
$1,400.00, then the value of one contract is $70 000. The ad-
vantages to trading E-Mini S&P500 contracts include liquidity,
greater affordability for individual investors and around-the-
clock trading.
Trading takes place 24 h a day with the exception of a short
technical maintenance shutdown period from 4:30 pm to 5:00
pm. The E-Mini S&P 500 expiration months are March, June,
September and December. On any given day, the contract with
the nearest expiration date is called the front-month contract.
The E-Mini S&P 500 is cash-settled against the value of the un-
derlying index and the last trading day is the third Friday of the
contract expiration month. The initial margin for speculators
and hedgers are $5,625 and $4,500, respectively. Maintenance
margins for both speculators and hedgers are $4,500. There
is no limit on how many contracts can be outstanding at any
given time.
The CME Globex matching algorithm for the E-Mini S&P
500 offers strict price and time priority. Specifically, limit or-
ders that offer more favourable terms of trade (sell at lower
prices and buy at higher prices) are executed prior to pre-
existing orders. Orders that arrived earlier are matched against
the orders from the other side of the book before other orders
at the same price. This market operates under complete price
transparency. This straight forward matching algorithm allows
us to reconstruct the order book using audit trail messages
archived by the exchanges and allows us to replay the market
dynamics at any given moment.
In this paper, empirical work is based on a month of E-Mini
order book audit trail data. The audit trail data includes all the
order book events timestamped at a millisecond time resolu-
tion, and contains the following data fields: date, time (the time
when the client submits the order to the exchange), conf_time
(the time when the order is confirmed by the matching engine),
customer account, tag 50 (trader identification number), buy
or sell flag, price, quantity, order ID, order type (market or
limit), and func_code (message type, e.g. order, modification,
cancellation, trade, etc.).
2.2. Summary statistic-based classiﬁcationofE-Minimarket
data
We apply the set of the statistics-based trader classification
rules documented by Kirilenko et al. (2011) on our E-Mini
data-set. For fundamental traders, we calculate their end of
the day net position. If the end-of-the-day net position is more
than 15% of their total trading volume on that day, we cat-
egorize them either as fundamental buyers or fundamental
sellers depending on their trading directions. We also identify
Ssall traders as those accounts with a trading volume of nine
contracts or less. We apply the criteria (Kirilenko et al. 2011)
for intermediaries, opportunistic traders and high-frequency
traders, and obtain consistent results based on the one-month
data. There are two steps involved in this process. First, we
ensure that the account’s net holdings fluctuate within 1.5% of
its end of day level, and second, we ensure the account’s end of
the day net position is no more than 5% of its daily trading vol-
ume. Then if we define HFTs as a subset of intermediaries (top
7% in daily trading volume), we find that there is a significant
amount of overlap between HFTs and opportunistic traders.
The problem is that the first criterion is not well defined, as the
fluctuation of net holdings is vaguely defined. Net holdings
could be measured in different ways.
In consultation with the authors of Kirilenko et al. (2011),
we choose the standard deviation of an account’s net position
measured on the event clock as a measure of an account’s
holding fluctuation. With this definition, we find that a 1.5%
fluctuation is too stringent for HFTs, because many high trading
volume accounts are classified as opportunistic traders, while
in reality their end of day positions are still very low compared
with other opportunistic traders. Therefore, it is adequate to
relax the first criterion requiring that the standard deviation of
the account’s net holdings throughout the day is less than its end
of day holding level. We find that the newly adjusted criteria
classify most high volume trading accounts as HFTs, and this
classification rule is validated from the registration informa-
tion we can acquire. Without this adjustment, almost all the
top trading accounts are incorrectly classified as opportunistic
traders. Table 1 summarizes the results after applying the new
classification rule demonstrating that the modified classifica-
tion criteria identified more HFTs. On average, there are 38
HTF accounts, 181 intermediary accounts, 2658 opportunistic
accounts, 906 fundamental buyer accounts, 775 fundamental
seller accounts, and 5127 small trader accounts. Over the 4-
week period, only 36% of the 120 accounts are consistently
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Table 1. The E-Mini S&P 500 futures market data summary.
Intermediaries Opportunistic Fundamental Fundamental Total number Total trading
Date HFTs traders buyers sellers of accountsa volumea
10/04/2012 39 193 2833 940 818 10 425 3 261 852
10/05/2012 38 162 2598 1191 1055 11 495 3 875 232
10/06/2012 38 167 2401 895 712 9065 2 852 244
10/07/2012 39 196 2726 919 747 9841 3 424 768
10/08/2012 32 162 2511 847 812 9210 3 096 800
10/11/2012 21 118 1428 636 573 6230 1 765 254
10/12/2012 38 186 2687 896 745 9771 3 236 904
10/13/2012 38 187 2582 1020 840 10 297 3 699 108
10/14/2012 30 198 3001 1070 795 10 591 4 057 824
10/15/2012 46 210 3109 890 773 9918 4 437 826
10/18/2012 37 173 2126 869 724 8735 2 458 510
10/19/2012 52 216 3651 1030 974 11 600 5 272 672
10/20/2012 39 176 2949 951 877 10 745 3 956 790
10/21/2012 43 240 3370 952 771 10 980 4 230 194
10/22/2012 32 143 1837 676 629 7370 2 026 234
10/25/2012 38 181 2533 888 684 9228 3 074 558
10/26/2012 37 175 2726 816 709 9568 3 000 628
10/27/2012 45 186 2973 919 820 10 472 3 850 556
10/28/2012 39 185 2873 914 705 9777 3 485 910
10/29/2012 37 160 2247 794 744 8369 3 012 860
aThe remaining accounts consist of the small trader accounts.
classified as the same type of traders. If we rank these accounts
by their daily trading volume, we find that only 40% of the
top 10 accounts are consistently classified as the same trader
types. The variation occurs among the HFTs, intermediaries
and opportunistic traders.
3. Markov decision process model of market dynamics
In this section, we develop a Markov decision process (MDP)
model of trader behaviour. This model will then serve as the
basis for the inverse reinforcement learning process described
in section 4.
3.1. MDP background and notation
The primary aim of our trading behaviour-based learning ap-
proach is to uncover decision-makers’ policies and reward
functions through the observations of an expert whose decision
process is modelled as an MDP. In this paper, we restrict
our attention to a finite countable MDP for easy exposition,
but our approach can be extended to continuous problems if
desired. A discounted finite MDP is defined as a tuple M =
(S,A,P, γ, r), where
• S = {sn}Nn=1 is a set of N states. Let N = {1, 2, · · · , N }.• A = {am}Mm=1 is a set of M actions. LetM = {1, 2, . . . , M}.
• P = {Pam}Mm=1 is a set of state transition probabilities (here
Pam is a N×N matrix where each row, denoted as Pam (sn, :
), contains the transition probabilities upon taking action
am in state sn . The entry Pam (sn, sn′) is the probability of
moving to state sn′ , n′ ∈ N in the next stage.).
• γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor.
• r denotes the reward function, mapping from S ×A to 




Pam (sn, sn′)r(sn, am, sn′)
where r(sn, am, sn′) denotes the function giving the reward of
moving to the next state sn′ after taking action am in current
state sn . The reward function r(sn, am) may be further reduced
to r(sn), if we neglect the influence of the action. We use r
for reward vector through out this paper. If the reward only
depends on state, we have r = (r(s1), . . . , r(sN )). If we let r
be the vector of the reward depending on both state and action.
We have
r = (r1(s1), . . . , r1(sN )︸ ︷︷ ︸, . . . , rM (s1), . . . , rM (sN )︸ ︷︷ ︸)
= ( r1, . . . , rM ).
In an MDP, the agent selects an action at each sequential
stage, and we define a policy (behaviour ) as the way that the
actions are selected by a decision-maker/agent. Hence, this
process can be described as a mapping between state and ac-
tion, i.e. a random state-action sequence
(
s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . st ,
at , · · · ),† where st+1 is connected to (st , at ) by Pat (st , st+1).
We also define rational agents as those that behave according
to the optimal decision rule where each action selected at any
stage maximizes the value function. The value function for
a policy π evaluated at any state s0 is given as V π (s0) =
E[∑∞t=0 γ t r(st , at )|π ]. This expectation is over the distribu-
tion of the state sequence
{
s0, s1, . . .
}
given the policy π ={
μ0, μ1, . . .
}
, whereat = μt (st ),μt (st ) ∈ U (st ) andU (st ) ⊂
A. The objective at state s is to choose a policy that maximizes
the value of V π (s). A policy π∗ is an optimal policy, if is
†Superscripts represent time indices. For example st and at , with the
upper-index t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, denote state and action at the t-th horizon
stage, while sn (or am ) represents the n-th state (or m-th action) in S
(or A).
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then V π∗(s0) = supπ E[
∑∞
t=0 γ t r(st , at )|π ]. Similarly, there
is another function called the Q-function (or Q-factor ) that
judges how well an action is performed in a given state. The
notation Qπ (s, a) represents the expected return from state s
when action a is taken and thereafter policy π is followed.
In the infinite-horizon case, the stationary Markovian struc-
ture of the problem implies that the only variable that affects
the agent’s decision rule and the corresponding value function
should be time invariant. We then have the essential theory of
MDPs (Bellman 1957) as follows:
Theorem 3.1 (Bellman Equations) Given a stationary pol-
icy π , ∀n ∈ N ,m ∈M, V π (sn) and Qπ (sn, am) satisfy










Theorem 3.2 (Bellman Optimality) π is optimal if and
only if, ∀n ∈ N , π(sn) ∈ arg maxa∈A Qπ (sn, a).
Based on the above theorem of MDPs, we have the following
equations to represent the Q-function as a the reward function.
Qπ (sn, am) = rm(sn) + γ Pam (sn, :)(I − γ Pπ )−1rm,
where Pπ represents the state transition probability matrix for
following policy π at every state, and rm represents the reward
vector under action am .
3.2. Constructing an MDP model from order book data
Figure 1 shows the entire life-cycle of an order initiated by a
client of an exchange. The order book audit trail data contains
these messages, and the entire order history (i.e. order creation,
order modifications, fills, cancellation, etc.) can be retrieved
and analyzed. To construct an MDP model of trader behaviour,
we first reconstruct the limit order book using the audit trail
messages. The order book then contains bid/ask prices, market
depth, liquidity, etc. During this process on the E-Mini data
described in section 2.1, we processed billions of messages for
each trading date, and built price queues using the price and
time priority rule.
In this construction process, we choose event tick time rather
than natural wall clock time. In other words, every activity
including arrival of a new order, cancellation of an existing
order, and placement of a market order is counted as one tick.
Once we have the order book at any given event tick, we take
the market depth at five different levels as our base variables
and then discretize these variables to generate an MDP model
state space. This study extends the MDP model documented
by Yang et al. (2012) to obtain five variables, i.e. order volume
imbalance between the best bid and the best ask prices, order
volume imbalance between the 2nd best bid and the 2nd best
ask prices, order volume imbalance between the 3rd best bid
and the 3rd best ask prices, the order book imbalance at the 5th
best bid and the 5th ask prices, and the inventory level/holding
position (see figure 2(b)). Then we discretize the values of the
five variables into three levels defined as high (above μ +
1.96σ ), neutral (μ± 1.96) and low (below μ− 1.96σ ). Based
on our observation that the first three best bid and ask prices
change the most, we find that it is critical to include the first
three-level order book imbalance variables in modelling the
limit order book dynamics. As argued by Yang et al. (2012),
these volume-related variables reflect the market dynamics on
which the traders/algorithms depend to place their orders at
different prices.
As the volume imbalance at the best bid/ask prices is the
most sensitive indicator of the trading behaviour of HFTs,
intermediaries and some of the opportunistic traders, we also
hypothesize that the volume imbalance at other prices close to
the book prices will be useful in inferring trader behaviour.
As demonstrated in previous work (Yang et al. 2012), the
private variable of a trader’s inventory level provides crit-
ical information about trader’s behaviour. Traders in high-
frequency environments strive to control their inventory levels
as a critical measure of controlling the risk of their position
(Easley et al. 2010, Brogaard 2010, Kirilenko et al. 2011).
HFTs and Market-makers tend to turn over their inventory level
five or more times a day and to hold very small or even zero
inventory positions at the end of the trading session. These
observations provide strong support for the introduction of a
position variable to characterize trader behaviour in our model.
Therefore, together with the volume imbalance variables, we
propose a computational model with 35 = 243 states.
Next, we need to define the action space. In general, there
are three types of actions: placing a new order, cancelling an
existing order, or placing a market order. We divide the limit
order book into 10 buckets at any given point of time by the
following price markers: the best bid price, the 2nd best bid
price, the 3rd best bid price, between the 4th and 5th bid prices,
below the 5th best bid price, the best ask price, the 2nd best ask
price, the 3rd best ask price, between the 4th and 5th ask prices,
and above the 5th best ask price. Then, at any given point of
time, a trader can take 22 actions. The price markers used to
define the price ranges are illustrated in figure 2. We define the
order volume imbalance through buckets. In other words, the
boundaries of these buckets define the volume between the two
adjacent best price levels. In case of missing prices between
the two adjacent best price levels, we only count the total
volume between them.Therefore, missing prices between these
best price levels will be acceptable for our volume imbalance
modelling. We use unit size for all the actions. Orders other than
unit size are treated as repeated actions without state transition.
Once we have both the state space and the action space
defined, we can then construct an MDP model where traders
interact with the order book. All actions from a trader can be
correlated with certain states in a probabilistic sense. From
trading strategy perspective, traders may choose to either react
to or influence order book movements. Although in most of the
cases, traders may choose to react to market changes to achieve
their investment objectives, anticipative or aggressive strate-
gies are also widely used. To some degree, certain aggressive
strategies through which specific actions are designed to create
desirable market conditions for themselves can be defined as
manipulative, but it is out of the scope of this paper. Over all,
a predefined trading strategy would consistently take certain
actions under certain market conditions within its permissible
or desirable inventory levels until these conditions change.This
process can be captured in a transition matrix of an MDPmodel.
Essentially, we have a 243x243 matrix for each action, which
1690 S. Y. Yang et al.
Figure 1. CME globex order lifecycle.T1: Trader submits a new order; T2: The state of an order is changed, if a stop is activated; T3: A trader
may choose to cancel an order, and the state of an order can be modified multiple times; T4: When an order is partially filled, the quantity
remaining decreases; T5: Order elimination is similar to order cancellation except it is initiated by the trading engine; T7: An order may be
filled completely; T6: Trades can be eliminated after the fact by the exchanges.
Figure 2. Order book MDP model: This graph shows the state variables used in the MDP model.
describes the Markovian decision process of a trading strategy.
In reality, these transition matrices are very sparse. For each
action, there are only a few desirable states, and most of the
elements are zeros. In the end, it is those scarce transitions
that reflect the uniqueness of the corresponding strategies. In
addition, we define a non-action in which the traders choose
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to do nothing as the market moves. Eventually, we have a
23x243x243 3-dimensional matrix for each trader based on
the frequencies we calculated from the sample data.
4. Inverse reinforcement learning
Given an MDPM = (S,A,P, γ, r), let us define the inverse
Markov decision process (IMDP)MI = (S,A,P, γ,O). The
process MI includes the states, actions and dynamics of M,
but lacks a specification of the reward function, r . By way of
compensation,MI includes a set of observationsO that consists
of state-action pairs generated through the observation of a
decision-maker. We can define the inverse reinforcement learn-
ing (IRL) problem associated with MI = (S,A,P, γ,O)
to be that of finding a reward function such that the observations
O could have come from an optimal policy for
M = (S,A,P, γ, r). The IRL problem is, in general, highly
under-specified, which has led researchers to consider various
models for restricting the set of reward functions under con-
sideration. Ng and Russel (2000), in a seminal consideration
of IMDPs and associated IRL problems, observed that, by the
optimality equations, the only reward vectors consistent with
an optimal policy π are those that satisfy the set of inequalities
(Pπ − Pa)(I − γ Pπ )−1r ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A, (1)
where Pπ is the transition probability matrix relating to ob-
served policy π and Pa denotes the transition probability ma-
trix for other actions. Note that the trivial solution r = 0 sat-
isfies the constraints (1), which highlights the under-specified
nature of the problem and the need for reward selection mech-
anisms.
In the machine learning and artificial intelligence literature,
a principal motivation for considering IRL problems is the
idea of apprenticeship learning, in which observations of state-
action pairs are used to learn the policies followed by experts
for the purpose of mimicking or cloning behaviour. By its na-
ture, apprenticeship learning problems arise in situations where
it is not possible or desirable to observe all state-action pairs for
the decision-maker’s policy. The basic idea of apprenticeship
learning through IRL is to first use IRL techniques to learn the
reward function (vector) and then use that function to define an
MDP problem, which can then be solved for an optimal policy.
Our process is quite different. We learn the reward function
with IRL and then directly use the rewards as features for
classifying and clustering traders or trading algorithms.
4.1. Linear IRL
Ng and Russel (2000) advance the idea choosing the reward
function to maximize the difference between the optimal and
suboptimal policies, which can be done using a linear program-
ming formulation.
Most of the existing IRL algorithms make some assumption
about the form of the reward function. Prominent examples
include the model in Ng and Russel (2000), which we term
linear IRL (LIRL) because of its linear nature. In LIRL, the
reward function is written linearly in terms of basis functions,
and effort is made to maximize the quantity∑
s∈S
[Qπ (s, a′) − max
a∈A\a′
Qπ (s, a)], ∀a′ ∈ A. (2)
The optimization problem in Ng and Russel (2000) is equiva-







(Pπ − Pa)(I − γ Pπ )−1r ≥ β(s), ∀a ∈ A,∀s ∈ S
β(s) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S,
where λ is a regularization parameter included to encourage
sparse solution vectors, and β(s) is the lower bound of the
function: Qπ (s, a′)− maxa∈A\a′ Qπ (s, a). Yang et al. (2012)
use this approach to find a feature space that can be used to
classify and cluster simulated trading agents. Here, reward is
defined as a function of state only, which means that agents
do not distinguish actions in seeking rewards under certain
conditions. This action-independent approximation for reward
is discussed further in the context of the Bayesian IRL frame-
work.
4.2. Bayesian IRL framework
Ramachandran andAmir (2007) originally proposed a Bayesian
Framework for IRL. The posterior over reward is written as:




Then, the IRLproblem is written as maxr log p(O|r)+log p(r).
For many problems, however, the computation of p(r |O) may
be complicated and some algorithms use Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) to sample the posterior probability. Below,
we adopt a different approach that uses the idea of selecting
reward on the basis of maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate
computed using convex optimization.
4.3. Gaussian process IRL
We now turn to an IRL problem that addresses observations
from a decision-making process in which the reward function
has been contaminated by Gaussian noise. In particular, we
assume that the reward vector can be modelled as r+N (0, σ 2),
where N (0, σ 2) is Gaussian noise. In the financial trading
problem setting, we may observe certain trading behaviour
over a period of time, but we may not observe the complete
polices behind a particular trading strategy. As discussed ear-
lier, different trading strategies tend to look at different time
horizons. Therefore, the observation period becomes critical to
the learning process. Furthermore, two types of errors may be
introduced into our observations: the first type of error may be
introduced during our modelling process. Resolution of these
discrete models will introduce errors into our observations.
The second potential source of error is the strategy execution
process. Execution errors will occur due to the uncertainty of
market movements and will eventually appear in our observa-
tions, confounding our efforts to determine the true policy.
Overall, there are two types of challenges in this learning
problem: the uncertainty about reward functions given the
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observation of decision behaviour and the ambiguity involved
in observing multiple actions at a single state.
Qiao and Beling (2011) argue for two different modelling
techniques in learning reward functions. To lessen the ambi-
guity of observing multiple actions at a state, they argue that
Bayesian inference should be the basis for understanding the
agent’s preferences over the action space. This argument is
reasonable because the goal of IRL is to learn the reward sub-
jectively perceived by the decision-maker from whom we have
collected the observation data. The intuition is that decision-
makers will select some actions at a given state because they
prefer these actions to others. These preferences are among
the countable actions that can be used to represent multiple
observations at one state.
Here, we use two examples to demonstrate how the ac-
tion preference relationships have been constructed based on
the MDP model and observed actions. Table 2 shows two
example states with multiple observed actions. We then sort
the frequency in descending order and construct a two-layer
graph: the top layer has the most frequently observed actions
and the bottom layer holds all the other actions. Based on
this preference observation, we can construct two preference
graphs as shown in figure 3. The state transition matrix can be
constructed for the entire market for the observation period. In
our MDP model, we have a 243 × 243 matrix for every single
action.
In the following, we first introduce the preference theory for
the IMDP model, and then we formalize the idea of modelling
the reward function as a Gaussian process under the Bayesian
inference framework.
4.3.1. Action preference learning. In this section, we first
define the action preference relationship and the action pref-
erence graph. At state sn , ∀aˆ, aˇ ∈ A, we define the action
preference relation as:
(i) Action aˆ is weakly preferred to aˇ, denoted as aˆ sn aˇ,
if Q(sn, aˆ) ≥ Q(sn, aˇ);
(ii) Action aˆ is strictly preferred to aˇ, denoted as aˆ sn aˇ, if
Q(sn, aˆ) > Q(sn, aˇ);
(iii) Action aˆ is equivalent to aˇ, denoted as aˆ ∼sn aˇ, if and
only if aˆ sn aˇ and aˇ sn aˆ.
An action preference graph is a simple-directed graph show-
ing preference relations among the countable actions at a given
state. At state sn , the action preference graph Gn = (Vn, En)
comprises a set Vn of nodes together with a set En of edges.
For the nodes and edges in graph Gn , let us define
(i) Each node represents an action inA. Define a one-to-one
mapping ϕ : Vn → A.
(ii) Each edge indicates a preference relation.
Furthermore, we make the following assumption as a rule
to build the preference graph, and then we show how to draw
a preference graph at state sn :
At state sn , if action aˆ is observed, we have the following





It is, therefore, straightforward to show the following ac-
cording to Bellman optimality. The variable aˆ is observed if
and only if aˆ ∈ arg maxa∈A Q(sn, a). Therefore, we have




According to the definition on preference relations, it follows
that if Q(sn, aˆ) > Q(sn, aˇ), we have aˆ sn aˇ. Hence, we
can show that the preference relationship has the following
properties:
(1) If aˆ, aˇ ∈ A, then at state sn either aˆ sn aˇ or aˇ sn aˆ.
(2) If aˆ sn aˇ and aˇ sn a˜, then aˆ sn a˜.
At this point, we have a simple representation of the action
preference graph that is constructed by a two-layer directed
graph. We may have either multiple actions at sn as in figure
4(a) or a unique action at sn as in figure 4(b). In this two-layer
directed graph, the top layer V+n is a set of nodes representing
the observed actions and the bottom layer V−n contains the
nodes denoting the other actions. The edge in the edge set
En can be represented by a formulation of its beginning node
u and ending node v. We write the k-th edge as (u → v)k if
u ∈ V+n , v ∈ V−n , or the l-th edge (u ↔ v)l if u ∈ V−n , v ∈ V−n .
Recall the mapping betweenVn andA, the representation u →
v indicates that action ϕ(u) is preferred over ϕ(v). Similarly,
u ↔ v means that action ϕ(u) is equivalent to ϕ(v).
In the context of financial trading decision process, we may
observe multiple actions from one particular trader under cer-
tain market conditions. That is to say that the observation data
O may represent multiple decision trajectories generated by
non-deterministic policies. To address IRL problems in those
cases, Qiao and Beling (2011) propose to process O into the
form of pairs of state and preference graphs similar to the
representation shown in figure 5, and then we apply Bayesian
inference using the new formulation.
According to Qiao and Beling (2011), we can represent O
as shown in figure 5. At state sn , its action preference graph is
constructed by a two-layer directed graph: a set of nodes V+n in
the top layer and a set of nodes V−n in the bottom layer. Under
the non-deterministic policy assumption, we adopt a reward
structure depending on both state and action.
4.3.2. Gaussian reward process. Recall that the reward de-
pends on both state and action, and consider rm , the reward
related to action am , as a Gaussian process. We denote by
km(si , s j ) the function generating the value of entry (i, j)
for covariance matrix Km , which leads to rm ∼ N (0, Km).
Then the joint prior probability of the reward is a product
of multivariate Gaussian, namely p(r|S) = ∏Mm=1 p(rm |S)
and r ∼ N (0, K). Note that r is completely specified by the
positive definite covariance matrix K, which is block diagonal
in the covariance matrices {K1, K2 . . . , KM } based on the as-
sumption that the reward latent processes are uncorrelated . In
practice, we use a squared exponential kernel function, written
as:
km(si , s j ) = e 12 (si−s j )Tm(si−s j ) + σ 2mδ(si , s j ),
where Tm = κmI and I is an identity matrix. The function
δ(si , s j ) = 1, when si = s j ; otherwise δ(si , s j ) = 0. Here si
and s j are feature vectors. If the feature dimension is 5 or in
R5, the difference between two vectors is a 5-dimension vector.
Under this definition the covariance is almost unity between
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Table 2. Action preference graph examples.
State Action Frequency observed State Action Frequency observed
14 1 0.23 158 1 0.30
14 2 0.14 158 3 0.07
14 7 0.06 158 7 0.11
14 11 0.26 158 11 0.30
14 12 0.09 158 17 0.07
14 16 0.17 158 18 0.07
14 22 0.06 158 20 0.07
Figure 4. Examples preference graphs: (a) An example of observing two actions at a state. (b) An example of a unique observation at a state.
variables whose inputs are very close in the Euclidean space,
and decreases as their distance increases.
Then, the GPIRL algorithm estimates the reward function
by iteratively conducting the following two main steps:
(1) Get estimation of rMAP by maximizing the posterior
p(r|O), which is equal to minimize − log p(O|r) −
log p(r|θ ), where θ denotes the vector of hyper-
parameters including κm and σm that control the
Gaussian process.
(2) Optimize the hyper-parameters by using gradient decent
method to maximize log p(O|θ , rMAP ), which is the
Laplace approximation of p(θ |O).
4.3.3. Likelihood function and MAP optimization. GPIRL
adopts the following likelihood functions to capture the strict
preference and equivalent preference, respectively.
p((aˆ sn aˇ)k |r) = 




p((aˆ ∼sn aˆ′)l |r) ∝ e−
1
2 (Q(sn ,aˆ)−Q(sn ,aˆ′))2 (4)
In equation (3), the function (x) = ∫ x−∞ N (v|0, 1)dv, where
N (v|0, 1) denotes a standard Gaussian variable.
As we stated earlier, if we model the reward functions as
being contaminated with Gaussian noise that has a mean of zero
and an unknown variance σ 2, we can then define the likelihood
function for both the k-th strict preference relation and the l-th
equivalent preference relation. Finally, we can formulate the
following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 The likelihood function, given the evidence
of the observed data (O in the form of pairs of state and action
preference graph (G), is calculated by









p((aˆ sn aˇ)k |r)
mn∏
l=1
p((aˆ ∼sn aˆ′)l |r), (5)
where nn denotes the number of edges for strict preference
and mn means the number of edges for equivalent preference
at state sn .
In conclusion, the probabilistic IRL model is controlled by
the kernel parameters κm and σm which compute the covari-
ance matrix of reward realizations, and by σ which tunes the
noise level in the likelihood function. We put these parameters
into the hyper-parameter vector θ = (κm, σm, σ ). More often
than not, we do not have prior knowledge about the hyper-
parameters. And then we can apply maximum a posterior esti-
mate to evaluate the hyper-parameters.
Essentially, we now have a hierarchical model.At the lowest
level, we have reward function values encoded as a parameter
vector r. At the top level, we have hyper-parameters in θ
controlling the distribution of the parameters. Inference takes
place one level at a time. At the bottom level, the posterior over
function values is given by Bayes’ rule:
p(r|S,G, θ ) = p(G|S, θ , r)p(r|S, θ )
p(G|S, θ ) . (6)
The posterior combines the prior information with the data,
reflecting the updated belief about r after observing the deci-
sion behaviour. We can calculate the denominator in equation
(6) by integrating p(G|S, θ , r) over the function space with
respect to r, which requires a high computational capacity. For-
tunately, we are able to maximize the non-normalized posterior
density of r without calculating the normalizing denominator,
as the denominator p(G|S, θ ) is independent of the values of r.
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Figure 5. Observation structure for MDP.
In practice, we obtain the maximum posterior by minimizing
the negative log posterior, which is written as






















(Q(sn, aˆ) − Q(sn, aˆ′))2 (7)
Qiao and Beling (2011) present a proof that Proposition (7) is




= 0 ⇒ rˆm = Km(∇ log P(G|S, θ , rˆ)) (8)
where rˆ = (rˆ1, . . . , rˆam , . . . , rˆm). In equation (8), we can use
Newton’s method to find the maximum ofU with the iteration,







5. Experiment with the E-Mini S&P 500 equity index
futures market
In this section, we conduct two experiments using the MDP
model defined earlier to identify algorithmic trading strate-
gies. We consider the six trader classes defined by Kirilenko
et al. (2011), namely high-frequency traders, market-makers,
opportunistic traders, fundamental buyers, fundamental sellers
and small traders. As we argue earlier, the focus of our study
will be more on HFTs and market-makers due to the large daily
volume and their potential impact to the financial markets. In
Kirilenko et al. (2011)’s paper, there are only about from 16 to
20 HFTs on the S&P500 Emini market.Although this is a small
population, their impact to the market has drawn increased
attention from policy-makers, regulators and academia. That
is why we focus our attention on this small population. Among
the roughly 10 000 trading accounts for the S&P500 Emini
market, we narrow down to about 120 accounts based their
high daily trading volume. In the first experiment, we select
the top 10 trading accounts by their volume and end-of-the-
day positions. In this we guarantee our subjects are HTFs.
In the second experiment, we randomly select 10 out of the
120 accounts. This selection criterion ensures that our subjects
are of either HTF or market-making strategies. With these
two experimentations we show the performance of our IRL-
based approach to identify the high impact population of the
algorithmic trading strategies.
5.1. Trader behaviour identiﬁcation
Yang et al. (2012) examine different trading behaviours using a
linear IRL (LNIRL) algorithm with the simulated E-Mini S&P
500 market data. That MDP model contains three variables: the
volume imbalance at the bid/ask prices, the volume imbalance
at the 3rd best bid/ask prices and the position level. Although
this MDP model is relatively simple, it is evident from the
experimental results that the IRL reward space is effective in
identifying trading strategies with a relatively high accuracy
rate.
This paper tries to address two important issues during the
modelling process to solve a realistic market strategy learning
problem using real market data. The first issue is that in reality,
we often do not have a complete set of observations of a trader’s
policies. As the market presents itself as a random process in
terms of both prices and volume, it is unlikely that we will
be able to capture all possible states during our observation
window. In contrast, the study performed by Yang et al. (2012)
assumes complete observation of a trader’s decision policies
for the simulated trading strategies. In other words, the policies
simulated by a distribution can be completely captured when
the simulation is run long enough. The convergence of these
simulated policies and the testing results are consistent with
their assumptions. However, when we use real market data to
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learn about trading strategies, it is necessary to address the
incomplete observation problem. The second issue is to the
assumption of deterministic policy versus non-deterministic
policy. Yang et al. (2012) make a deterministic policy assump-
tion. Under the linear feature optimization framework, non-
deterministic policies can be represented by a single maximum
deterministic policy. In this study, we relax the deterministic
policy assumption and allow non-deterministic policies under
a Gaussian process framework. As we argue earlier, Gaussian
process learning allows us to infer policies even when we
have a very limited set of observations. At the same time, we
incorporate Gaussian preference learning into our inference
process. This approach helps us to incorporate less frequently
observed policies into our reward learning process. Together,
the proposed GPIRL approach results in a model that relies less
on observations and makes fewer assumptions on the polices
we are to learn.
5.2. Multi-class support vector machine trader classiﬁer
using GPIRL vs. LNIRL
This section uses the support vector machine (SVM) classifica-
tion method to identify traders based on reward functions that
we recover from the observations of the trader’s behaviours.
We select a group of traders whose behaviours are consistently
observed during the period we study. The primary reason for
choosing the SVM classification method is its flexibility that
allows us to explore feature separation in different high dimen-
sional spaces using kernel functions. We aim to compare the
performance of the two behaviour learning algorithms LNIRL
and GPIRL, and to show that GPIRL perform better in real-
world trading strategy identification.
We constructed 80 sample trajectories for each of the top
10 trading accounts. While there are 121 trading accounts
consistently traded over the 4-week period, this study focuses
on the top 10 trading accounts. We apply both the LNIRL (Ng
and Russel 2000, Yang et al. 2012), and GPIRL (Qiao and
Beling 2011) to these 800 samples.And then we apply the SVM
algorithm to the 10 traders using pair-wise classification. For
each pair, we first train a SVM classifier (with Gaussian kernel)
with 60 randomly selected samples, and test the classification
on the remaining 20 samples. We repeat the sampling 100 times
and then take the average classification accuracy. We list both
LNIRL classification results in table 3, and GPIRL results in
table 4. On average, LNIRL gives a classification accuracy
of 0.6039, while GPIRL achieves a classification accuracy of
0.9650. This result confirms our earlier assumption that GPIRL
performs better when we have incomplete observations, and
incorporate non-deterministic policies through Gaussian pref-
erence learning.
5.3. Trading strategy clustering and comparison with the
summary statistic-based approach
Next, we will show that our IRL-based behaviour identification
approach is far superior to the statistic-based approach. We will
use the top 10 trading accounts as examples to demonstrate im-
provement of behaviour-based trading strategy identification
achieved using the Gaussian Preference IRL model.
In the previous section, we discovered that using reward
functions we can reliably identify a particular trading strategy
over a period of time with a relatively high accuracy. In this
section, we want to study the similarity of reward character-
ization among the different trading strategies. This problem
can be characterized as an unstructured learning problem—
clustering. We have the characterization of rewards over the
state space and action space, and we aim to group trading strate-
gies based on their similarity over the Cartesian product of the
state and action spaces. We also attempt to establish connec-
tions between these trading strategy classification definitions
established by Kirilenko et al. (2011) and our behaviour-based
trading strategy clustering.
The first problem we have to address is the dimensionality of
the feature space. We essentially have a reward structure over
a large set of feature sets. This feature set is a product of the
state space and the action space in our computational model.
Fortunately, under the LNIRL algorithm, we reduce the feature
space to only the state space because in this linear feature
expectation optimization problem we only consider reward at
a particular state. Under the deterministic policy assumption,
we assume that the value function converges at a particular
state. In other words, the reward function is not a function
of actions. In this case, we have 243 features that must be
considered during the clustering. However, under the GPIRL
framework we do not assume deterministic policy, and we treat
reward as a function of both states and actions. Therefore we
have 243x30 features for the latter approach. We also observe
that the reward matrix is relatively sparse where there are zero
values at many states. To consider computational tractability
and efficiency, we first examine the data structure through
principal component analysis.
In the LNIRL case, the first two principal components (PCs)
explain 79.78% of the data variation, and from the upper left
plot in figure 6(a) we see that the first 200 PCs provide nearly
100% explanatory power. In the GPIRL case, the first two PCs
only explain 38.98% of the data variation. Looking at the upper
left plot in figure 6(b), we see that more PCs are needed to have
better represent the data. To balance the accuracy and computa-
tional efficiency, we choose the first 200 PCs for the LNIRLand
the first 400 PCs for the GPIRL case. This reduction leads to
significant gain in computational efficiency and sacrifices less
than 2% data variation (lower left figure in both figure 6(a)
and (b)). From the upper right plots in both the LNIRL and
the GPIRL spaces, we see that the first two PCs give a good
representation along the first PC and that in the LNIRLcase, the
feature vector representation is evenly distributed between the
first two PCs. The LNIRL space includes distinctly separated
observations. On the other hand, the GPIRL space contains
concentrations of observations, but unclear boundaries. In both
cases, we would expect the PC dimension reduction tech-
nique to achieve relatively good representation of the data
variation.
Now, we apply unsupervised learning method to group the
trading behaviour observed on a selected group of trading
accounts over the observation period. We select 10 trading
accounts with the highest average daily trading volume over
a period of 4 weeks (20 days) in our first experiment. We
define an observation instance as a continuous period covering
two hours over which we take all the activities of a particular
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Table 3. Pair-wise trader classification using SVM binary classification using LNIRL.
[,1] [,2] [,3] [,4] [,5] [,6] [,7] [,8] [,9] [,10]
[1,] 0.0000 0.5437 0.5187 0.4812 0.6375 0.4812 0.5312 0.5750 0.7750 0.5937
[2,] 0.5437 0.0000 0.5250 0.5125 0.7437 0.5562 0.4937 0.4250 0.7625 0.6812
[3,] 0.5187 0.5250 0.0000 0.4687 0.6875 0.5250 0.5187 0.5250 0.7312 0.6250
[4,] 0.4812 0.5125 0.4687 0.0000 0.6937 0.5000 0.4937 0.5062 0.6562 0.6625
[5,] 0.6375 0.7437 0.6875 0.6937 0.0000 0.6625 0.7375 0.6875 0.7750 0.5437
[6,] 0.4812 0.5562 0.5250 0.5000 0.6625 0.0000 0.5500 0.5500 0.6500 0.6375
[7,] 0.5312 0.4937 0.5187 0.4937 0.7375 0.5500 0.0000 0.4937 0.8000 0.6125
[8,] 0.5750 0.4250 0.5250 0.5062 0.6875 0.5500 0.4937 0.0000 0.6437 0.6562
[9,] 0.7750 0.7625 0.7312 0.6562 0.7750 0.6500 0.8000 0.6437 0.0000 0.7437
[10,] 0.5937 0.6812 0.6250 0.6625 0.5437 0.6375 0.6125 0.6562 0.7437 0.0000
Note: The columns and rows of this table represent anonymous traders.
Table 4. Pair-wise trader classification using SVM binary classification using GPIRL.
[,1] [,2] [,3] [,4] [,5] [,6] [,7] [,8] [,9] [,10]
[1,] 0.0000 1.0000 0.9875 0.9750 0.9500 0.9750 0.9625 1.0000 0.9750 1.0000
[2,] 1.0000 0.0000 0.9750 0.9375 0.9875 0.9750 0.9625 0.9625 0.9875 1.0000
[3,] 0.9875 0.9750 0.0000 0.9750 0.9625 0.9875 1.0000 0.9750 0.9750 0.9875
[4,] 0.9750 0.9375 0.9750 0.0000 0.9750 0.9500 0.9375 0.9875 0.9875 0.9750
[5,] 0.9500 0.9875 0.9625 0.9750 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9625 0.9875 1.0000
[6,] 0.9750 0.9750 0.9875 0.9500 1.0000 0.0000 0.9625 0.8750 0.9125 0.9750
[7,] 0.9625 0.9625 1.0000 0.9375 1.0000 0.9625 0.0000 0.8625 0.9625 0.9875
[8,] 1.0000 0.9625 0.9750 0.9875 0.9625 0.8750 0.8625 0.0000 0.8000 1.0000
[9,] 0.9750 0.9875 0.9750 0.9875 0.9875 0.9125 0.9625 0.8000 0.0000 0.9625
[10,] 1.0000 1.0000 0.9875 0.9750 1.0000 0.9750 0.9875 1.0000 0.9625 0.0000
Note: The columns and rows of this table represent anonymous traders.
trader including placing new orders, modifying and cancelling
existing orders and placing market orders. For each trader,
we collect four observation instances on each trading date:
two observation instances during the morning trading and two
observation instances during the afternoon trading. The two
observation periods in the morning and in the afternoon have
an hour overlap time, but the observations in the morning
and the afternoon do not overlap. This observation distribu-
tion is selected based on the general theory of intraday U-
shaped patterns in volume - namely, that trading is heavy at
the beginning and the end of the trading day and relatively
light in the middle of the day (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988,
Chordia et al. 2001, Lee et al. 2001, Ekman 2006). We also
examined traders’ actions throughout the entire trading day.
We found that the two-hour observation time is a good cut-off,
and with the overlapping instances in both the morning and
the afternoon we expect to capture the U-shaped pattern of the
market.
We then perform hierarchical clustering and generate a heat
map and dendrogram of the observations in both the LNIRL
reward space and the GPIRL reward space. The simplest form
of matrix clustering clusters the rows and columns of a data-set
using Euclidean distance metric and average linkage. For both
figure 7(a) and (b), the left dendrogram shows the clustering
of the observations (rows), and the top dendrogram shows the
clustering of the PCs (columns). It is evident that there is a clear
division of the observations (rows) in both cases. Upon closer
examination, the left dendrogram contains two clusters: the top
cluster and the bottom cluster with a black dividing strip in the
middle of the second small cluster. We then zoomed into the
small cluster and look for the sources of these observations†.
In the LNIRL reward space, we find that the small cluster
consists mostly of observations from trader 1 (observations
numbered from 1 to 80) and trader 2 (observations numbered
from 81 to 160). Observations from trader 9 (observations
numbered from 641 to 720) form the black division between
these two groups. In the GPIRL reward space, we find that the
small cluster consists of three traders: trader 1 (observations
numbered from 1 to 80), trader 2 (observations numbered from
81 to 160), and trader 5 (observations numbered from 321 to
400) with the observations from the rest of the traders lying
on the other side of the divide. Moreover, we find that the
observations from trader 9 (observations numbered from 641
to 720) form the black division between these two groups.
These observations show that the majority of the top 10 traders
form one group with 2 or 3 traders behaving a little differently.
Furthermore, we observe that the clustering has less than per-
fect purity. In other words, individual observations from the
top cluster occasionally lie in the small cluster at the bottom
indicating that behaviour changes over time. The interpretation
of this observation is that the HFTs may behave like oppor-
tunistic traders for a short period of time. We also occasionally
†Note: In both figure 6(a) and (b), we group observations from the
same trader together in our data matrix. We have 10 traders and each
has 80 observations. From the lower left graph in both (a) and (b),
observations are ordered sequentially by trader IDs. For example,
observations 1 through 80 come from trader 1, and observations 81
through 160 come from trader 2. This continues along the X-axis up
to observations 721 through 800 from trader 10.
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Figure 6. Principal component representation of the reward data: (a). Data representation under the first two PCs in the LNIRL reward
space; The upper left figure shows cumulative percentage of the data variance explained by the PCs. The lower left figure plots the loadings of
all the observations onto the first two PCs; The upper right figure shows the projection of the observation and feature vector onto the first two
PCs. The lower right shows the projection of the observation onto the first two PCs with boundary point markers. (b) Data representation under
the first two principal components in the GPIRL reward space. The upper left figure shows the cumulative percentage of the data variance
explained by the PCs. The lower left figure plots the loadings of all the observations on to the first two PCs. The upper right figure shows the
projection of the observation and feature vectors onto the first two PCs. The lower right figure shows the projection of the observation onto
the first two PCs with boundary point markers.
observe opportunistic traders behaving like HFTs. In this case,
observations cross the divide into the top cluster.
Next we propose a continuous measure of clustering us-
ing the hierarchical clustering method. We use the summary
statistic-based trader classification method proposed by
Kirilenko et al. (2011) to create reference labels. For this mar-
ket data, we do not have true labels on those trading accounts.
We aim to improve the labelling methods documented by
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Figure 7. Hierarchical clustering of data matrix: (a). Heat map of 800 observations of the LNIRL rewards in the first 200 PCs. (b). Heat
map of 800 observations in GPIRL rewards in the first 400 PCs.
Kirilenko et al. The motivation for creating a continuous mea-
sure of clustering is to address the potential changes in
trading behaviour over time. As we mentioned earlier, we
applied the summary statistic-based classification rule on the
200 observations over the 4-week period and found we can
only consistently label the traders as a single type 40% of the
time. We now define a weighted scoring system to evaluate
both the rule-based classifier and the behaviour-based classi-
fier. Among the 6 types of traders defined in the data section,
we only concerned with labelling HFTs, intermediaries and
opportunistic traders. The other three types of traders, e.g.
fundamental buyers, fundamental sellers and small traders, can
be reliably identified by their daily volume and their end of
day positions. Here, we assign score 2 if a trader is classified
as a HFT; we assign score 1 if a trader is classified as an
opportunistic trader; and we assign 0 if a trader is classified as
an intermediary. Labels for clustering are assigned using the
majority voting rule based on the summary statistic classifica-
tion rule. We then combine the scores using a weight defined
as the frequency with which a particular score is assigned to
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Figure 8. Top 10 traders: trader’s daily trading volume versus daily end position during a 20-day period. (a) Randomly selected 10 traders:
traders 1, 2 and 5 have varying end positions. (b) Traders 1, 2 and 7 have varying end positions.
a particular trader. Here, we want to compare the summary
statistic-based trader type classification with the behaviour-
based trader type classification in an effort to find connections
between these two methods.
The visual representations in figure 8(a) show that trader 1
and trader 5 have a wide range of end of day positions, but their
daily trading volumes remains at relatively the same levels.
These traders will likely be classified sometimes as HFTs and
sometimes as opportunistic traders. While trader 2 exhibits a
smaller range of end of day positions than trader 1 and trader 5,
the general pattern is very similar to that of traders 1 and 5, and
we should classify trader 2 as an opportunistic trader. Based on
this manual examination, traders 1, 2 and 5 should be classified
as opportunistic traders and the rest should be classified as
HFTs. Now, we compare the results of the summary statistic-
based classification rule with those of the behaviour-based
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Figure 9. Trader-type classiﬁcation compared with the summary statistic-based rule classiﬁcation for the top 10 traders. (a) Hierarchical
clustering in the LNIRL reward space. (b) Hierarchical clustering in the GPIRL reward space.
Figure 10. Trader-type classification compared with the summary statistic-based rule classification for the 10 randomly selected traders: (a)
Hierarchical clustering in LNIRL reward space. (b) Hierarchical clustering in GPIRL reward space.
classification. Figure 9(a) shows that two groups of traders exist
in the LNIRL reward space. Eight out of ten are identified as
HFTs and only trader 1 and trader 2 are classified as opportunis-
tic traders. This result is consistent with our observation from
the dendrogram in figure 7(a). When we compare this result
with the GPIRL reward space, we can locate all three traders (1,
2 and 5) that we identified through the manual process. This
result is also consistent with our observation from the heat
map in figure 7(b). The statistic-based classification method
misclassified trader 2 because the cut-off in the statistic-based
approach is based on a simple ratio between the trading volume
and the end position. We can see that trader 2 has a relatively
small spread of end position. However, the behaviour-based
approach can identify this pattern and is able to cluster this
trader with other traders with similar patterns.
We run another experiment using 10 randomly selected
traders out of the traders with the top 30 trading volumes. We
know this selection will only result in three types of traders, i.e.
HFTs, intermediaries and opportunistic traders. We feed these
800 observations to both LNIRL and GPIRL algorithms to ob-
tain reward representations of their trading behaviours. Based
on visual examination (see figure 8(b)), we see that trader 1,
trader 2 and trader 7 are opportunistic traders and the rest are
HFTs. We apply the same techniques as before and we use
the same cut-off scores (1.85 in the LNIRL reward space (see
figure 10(a)), and 1.75 in the GPIRL reward space(see figure
10(b)).As a result, we can accurately identify the two classes of
traders using the same cut-off score we used for the top 10 case
(see figure 10). The classification in the LNIRL reward space
gives the same result as that in the GPIRL reward space, while
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the statistic-based classification method misclassified trader 3
as an opportunistic trader. Based on the daily end position,
daily total trading volume and inventory variance, trader 3
should be classified as a HFT. Again, this misclassification is
due to the aggregate cut-off ratio. However, the behaviour-
based approach can identify this pattern and is able to cluster
trader 3 with other traders with similar behavioural patterns.
Overall, we argue that the GPIRL reward space score-based
classification rule provides an advantage over the summary
statistic-based approach in that it is based on similarity in
behaviour and it can be clearly interpreted. Because the GPIRL
rule a better reflects traders’ choices of actions under different
market conditions than the summary statistics, it is well suited
for the discovery of new behavioural patterns of the market
participants. We also conclude that the GPIRL reward space
is more informative and is a superior measure of trading be-
haviour in terms of the LNIRL reward space.
6. Conclusion
We assume incomplete observation of algorithmic trading
strategies and model traders’ reward functions as a Gaussian
process. We also incorporate traders’ action preferences under
different market conditions through preference graph learning.
The aim of this study is to quantify trader behaviour-based
on IRL reward learning under a Bayesian inference frame-
work. We apply both a linear approach (a linear combination
of known features) (Abbeel and Ng 2004) and GPIRL (Qiao
and Beling 2011) to a real market data-set (The E-Mini S&P
500 Futures), and we conclude that GPIRL is superior to the
LNIRL methods, with a 36% greater rate of identification accu-
racy. Furthermore, we establish a connection between the sum-
mary statistic-based classification (Kirilenko et al. 2011) and
our behaviour-based classification. We propose a score-based
method to classify trader types, and because of the transferable
property of the reward structure the cut-off score for classifying
a group of traders can be applied to different market conditions.
The implication of this research is that reward/utility-based
trading behaviour identification can be applied to real market
data to accurately identify specific trading strategies. As docu-
mented by Abbeel et al. (Abbeel and Ng 2004) and confirmed
by many other researchers, the reward function is the most
succinct, robust, and transferable definition of a control task.
Therefore, the behaviour learned using the reward space has
much broader applicability than observed policies. Further-
more, these learned reward functions will allow us to replicate
a particular trading behaviour in a different environment to
understand their impact on the market price movement and
market quality in general.
We also want to note some future research on improving
the identification accuracy and discuss applications of this
behavioural characterization:
• During our preference learning inference phase, we only
considered a simple two-layer preference graph. How-
ever, traders’ preferences can be further distinguished
with multi-layer graphs or other preference learning tech-
niques.
• Our study focused on the sampled algorithmic traders
on a market. Future studies can extend these results
to a large scale experiment to include market partici-
pants (specifically opportunistic traders), and study their
behavioural similarity through clustering. We can then
associate the group behaviour with market quality mea-
sures.
• Under the GPIRL framework, we are able to recover a
detailed reward structure. These reward functions can be
used to generate new policies under a simulated market
condition to understand the full behaviour of certain
trading strategies. This framework provides a particu-
larly interesting way for market regulators to see how the
various trading strategies will interact during stressed
market conditions.
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